

考试科目 专业英语 得分

专 业: 专门史、世界史

请把答案写在答题纸上, 写在试卷上一律无效。本卷分为 A、B 两部分, 供不同专业考生选作, 请看清!

A (专门史专业考生用题)

将以下英文译为中文:

I (60分) Symmetrical or asymmetrical, strategies if they are to succeed must be capable of winning public and Congressional support. Nixon and Kissinger went about this task in a strangely ambivalent way. On the one hand, they set forth the broad outlines of their strategy with a candor and clarity unmatched by any other postwar administration. They coupled this, though, with an equally unprecedented reliance on secrecy—at times even outright deception—at the tactical level. The assumption seems to have been that while the public and its representatives had a right to know in what general direction the nation was heading, judgments as to appropriate measures for getting there were best left to those at the top, with minimal interference from below.⁷⁵ It was an approach better calculated to facilitate innovation than widespread enthusiasm on the part of those necessarily left in the dark as to how such accomplishments had been brought about.

Kissinger had proposed, during the early days of the administration, issuing in the President's name an annual report on foreign policy, roughly comparable to the Defense Department "posture statements" that McNamara had originated during the early 1960's. The report was to serve, Kissinger recalled, "as a conceptual outline of the President's foreign policy, as a status report, and as an agenda for action. It could simultaneously guide our bureaucracy and inform foreign governments about our thinking."⁷⁶ Drafted largely by Kissinger and his staff, the four reports issued between 1970 and 1973—each around 200 pages in length—constituted a serious and frank effort to explain the basic geopolitical assumptions behind the administration's approach to the world. The first report set the tone by stating candidly that "our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy." There followed a detailed discussion, often at a philosophical level, that set forward with surprising explicitness most of the fundamental elements of the Nixon strategy—the use of negotiations to integrate the Soviet Union into the existing international order, the idea of "linkage," the possibility of a new relationship with Peking, the Nixon Doc-

trine—often before events had taken place that made possible their realization.⁷⁷

Kissinger later admitted that the annual foreign policy reports had probably failed in getting across to the public the conceptual basis of the administration's strategy. The problem was the media, which "would cover only the section on Vietnam, probing for hot news or credibility gaps, ignoring the remainder as not newsworthy."⁷⁸ After becoming Secretary of State in September 1973, he dropped the reports, relying instead on a series of carefully crafted and, on the whole, no less candid public speeches to convey a sense of his strategy—with not much better results, as far as press coverage was concerned.⁷⁹ Still, Kissinger must be credited with having made a more sustained and more serious effort than any of his predecessors to explain openly the general outlines of what the administration of which he was a part was trying to do.

This candor emphatically did not extend, though, to the level of tactics. The administration secretly bombed North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia from March 1969, despite public assurances that it would respect that country's neutrality. Similar deception occurred with regard to the Allende regime in Chile: "the government's legitimacy is not in question," Kissinger wrote in the second annual foreign policy report; "we will not be the ones to upset traditional relations."⁸⁰ Again, during the India-Pakistan War, the administration followed a secret pro-Pakistani policy at a time when public opinion was almost unanimously condemning that government's atrocities in what was to become Bangladesh; in this case, Nixon and Kissinger suffered the indignity of having their cover "blown" when columnist Jack Anderson published leaked versions of their internal deliberations.⁸¹ Negotiations by the "backchannel" system were yet another example of administration secrecy at the tactical level: on such issues as Berlin, Vietnam, and China, potential adversaries often knew more about what was going on than did American allies, or the American public.

Kissinger and Nixon justified this resort to secrecy on the grounds of necessity: their considerable achievements, they argued, could never have been carried out if subjected throughout to the full glare of publicity. One reason was inherent in the very nature of diplomacy itself: "Any successful negotiation must be based on a balance of mutual concessions," Kissinger noted. "The sequence in which concessions are made becomes crucial; it can be aborted if each move has to be defended individually rather than as part of a mosaic before the reciprocal move is clear." Speed could also be important at critical moments: to allow the process of bu-

reaucratic clearances to determine the pace of negotiations could be to wreck them. Another problem involved allies: even the best intentioned of them could torpedo delicate discussions by demanding to be consulted—and reassured—ahead of time. "Secrecy unquestionably exacts a high price in the form of a less free and creative interchange of ideas within the government," Nixon later admitted. "But I can say unequivocally that without secrecy there would have been no opening to China, no SALT agreement with the Soviet Union, and no peace agreement ending the Vietnam war." Kissinger put it more bluntly: "To maintain our control over the presentation of the event was synonymous with maintaining control over our policy and its consequences."⁸²

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II (40分)

At times when a system is being formed rather than ensuring conformity, two particular areas of activity might be expected to come under strain. When power is on the move from one kind of entity to another, and taking a century in the process, there will be lack of clarity about who really possesses it and thus uncertainty about the optimum structure for the policy-making mechanisms of both old and new entities as well as what policy should actually be. The second and perhaps most sensitive area is in the machinery by which relations were being conducted, which will inevitably have been formed to meet the needs of a different troupe of actors from those now crowding onto the stage.

The cause of uncertainty about the locus of power lay in a structural change induced by the emergence of independent, secular, states. They related to each other in a fundamentally vertical way, as a group of free-standing upright blocks and exchanged opinions and information, embarked on negotiations and, at times, came to blows through a network of contacts linking the blocks. The most obvious example of this shift had been the evolution of the resident ambassador, a process just reaching its conclusion in the early 1600s. Nothing could have more clearly confirmed the significance and profundity of the change than this development. The duties of a resident could only be to further the interests of his principal. The Italian city state system had generated the resident earlier and produced a clear statement of what it meant: "The first duty of an ambassador is exactly the same as that of any other servant of a government, that is, to do, say, advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandisement of his own state" and to provide him with the best possible information about conditions, particularly political conditions at his post. Echoes of earlier

obligations could occasionally still be heard – such as to the general obligation to seek peace, or to further the interests of Christian Europe as a whole.³ But the most important member of the diplomatic machine was now committed to serving the needs of an individual state and other parts of the system were being reconstructed – amidst much turmoil – to accommodate the existence of residents.⁴ At this point, however, the new diplomatic figure was far from being the only one. Increasingly, diplomatic traffic of all kinds was being entrusted to the resident, but episodes of diplomacy conducted by special missions – once the only kind – continued to happen, and highly ceremonial missions, generally related to royal births, marriages and deaths, also continued to have a separate life. Moreover, this paralleled the fact that while states and their resident ambassadors had arrived, they had not yet squeezed out the structures and assumptions of the past. Two extremely important ones survived: the notion that some duty was owed to the idea of Christian Europe, particularly when seen against the active threat from an Ottoman Turkey not yet in decline. This led to extremely uncomfortable paradoxes between appeals to restore Christian unity and a general tendency of rulers to wriggle out of abandoning the independent pursuit of their more immediate interests which responding to the appeal would have implied. The second and more powerful survivor was the notion of the continuing role of the Holy Roman Empire as at least a pan-German institution, even though the Reformation itself and the subsequent extensive and particularly violent warfare which it had induced, had begun to destroy it. It is clear that the French supposed that the Empire could not and would not survive in the face of the fissiparous tendency which state making emphasized, and sought to base their anti-Habsburg policy on encouraging German princes to seize complete sovereignty; but, interestingly, they refused to do so.⁵ More shadowy was the universal role which the counter-reformation papacy still claimed. The claim, for example, led the Pope to declare the Westphalia settlement null and void; but its shadowy nature allowed the parties to ignore the Pope's condemnation entirely. What all this meant was that there was a thoroughly confusing mixture of older, declining, universalist authorities, operating essentially horizontally across the system, and newer, rising, vertical centres of power located in independent, secular, states.

考试科目 专业英语 得分

专业: 专门史. 世界史

B (世界史专业考试问题)

I (20分)

There indeed the old property tax *tributum* was no longer levied after 168 B.C. except probably in the disturbed years that followed Caesar's death, but it may be doubted if it was ever formally abolished, and whether the immunity of Italian land was more than a fact of actual experience. But the practical difference between the immunity of Italian land and the taxation of provincial land evidently gave rise to Frontinus' notion that the provincial property tax was a form of rent, confusing sovereignty with some kind of 'eminent domain'; this was a mere inference from the fact that Rome chose, where she had the power, to raise revenue in particular ways, and not the true explanation, nor the best defence of provincial taxation (which is that given by Cicero etc.). No further consequences were deduced from the notion; in reality it was possible to own private lands in the provinces by a title that differed only technically from *dominium* in Italy. The theories of Gaius and Frontinus do not make the true distinction between domains of the people or emperor on which the tenants paid rent and the lands, e.g. in the city territories, which were subject to direct taxation, but which had all the other characteristics of private property. But even if we grant that Rome claimed 'eminent domain' over all provincial land, we still cannot believe that the so-called 'public land' of Egypt or the estates of the people in Numidia and Mauretania were vested in Caesar, except for purposes of administration.

II (50分)

In 1892 Lord Salisbury, commenting on a set of social reforms proposed by Joseph Chamberlain, told Arthur Balfour, 'these social questions are destined to break up our party.' Salisbury's remark was informed by his characteristic pessimism, but in many respects his concern was both understandable and justifiable, for 'the social question' and the role of the state in addressing it were issues which posed significant problems for the Conservative Party

The Conservatives' concern with the social question began in earnest in 1884 – there had been *sporadic* interest before but it was the mid-1880s which witnessed the development of a more systematic level of debate. The electoral reforms of 1884–5 provided the main impetus for this interest in social issues. The extension of the franchise in 1884 had added 1.76 million new voters to the electorate, and it had ensured that, for the first time, working-class voters predominated in both town and country. Conservative assumptions about the *nature* of this new mass electorate shaped their perception of the political implications of the franchise extension. Writing in 1883 Salisbury had described a democracy as 'consisting of men who are ordinarily engrossed by the daily necessities of self support',² alluding to the cross-party consensus that a mass electorate could but be an impoverished electorate. Salisbury's view that this posed a *particular* difficulty for the Conservatives stemmed from his assumption that material considerations would matter more to the poorer elements of society than attachment to established institutions, and that an improvement in their standard of living would be their main priority. In this respect Salisbury agreed with the Fabian Society that the political enfranchisement of the masses would be followed by a demand for their social and economic enfranchisement. What Conservatives saw as threatening in this was that the poor masses would seek to gain material improvement at the expense of the better-off. The spectre haunting Salisbury and his party in the early 1880s was the radical demagogue exploiting the privations of the poorer classes of elector and 'impressing upon them that the function of legislation is to transfer to them something . . . from the pockets of their more fortunate countrymen'.³ Hence, somewhat ironically, Joseph Chamberlain appeared to symbolize the dangerous potential of the new politics when he fused his belief that 'the future of politics are social politics' with his demand to know what 'ransom' property would pay to preserve its privileges.⁴ From 1884 a central assumption of British politics, which the Conservative Party did not dispute, was that finding an answer to the social question was bound to be an electoral imperative. In turn this meant that the Conservatives, like their political opponents, had to define, or perhaps more accurately redefine, the boundaries of the state.

考试科目 专 业 英 语 得 分 _____

专 业: 专 门 文 学 世 界 史

The social question posed two distinct but related practical problems for the Conservative Party. First, there was the question of whether they could satisfy the desire of the mass electorate for material betterment. Second, there was the issue of whether they could do this without injuring other elements of society. But both these issues necessarily raised the more abstract problem of the role of the state. On a general level, securing material improvement for the masses posed questions about the boundaries of state action – the proper function of the state, and its relationship to civil society and the individual were major ethical issues in this context. On a more specific level there was the problem of who was to pay for any state action to improve the lot of the poorer classes – the proper function of the state in securing social and especially distributive justice. This last issue was particularly problematic given the fiscal climate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The seemingly effortless budgetary surpluses enjoyed by mid-Victorian governments had given way to a growing 'fiscal crisis' of the British state, with both central and local government budgets under increasing strain.⁵ By the late 1880s it was evident that any new bold social policy initiative involving significant new expenditure by the state would require new sources of revenue – for the first time since the 1840s the nature and legitimacy of Britain's tax regime was being scrutinized.⁶ The Conservatives thus faced both ethical and economic problems concerning the role of the state, and, what was equally important, had to confront the relationship between the two.

III (30分)

The German Empire after 1890: William II

William I died in 1888 and was succeeded by his son Frederick III who, incurably ill of cancer, died some three months after his accession. Frederick's son, William II, the last king of Prussia and the last German Kaiser, began his reign (1888-1918) as a young man of twenty-nine, full of startling ideas about his personal power and privileges. He was uncomfortable in the presence of an elder statesman who had made the German Empire, who had been his grandfather's aide and adviser, and whom he regarded partly with veneration and partly as an old fogey. William soon quarreled with Bismarck over continuation of the antisocialist laws and over matters of foreign affairs. When Bismarck forbade his ministers to meet with the emperor on policy matters unless he was present, William resolved that he, and not Bismarck, would rule the empire, and in 1890 he ordered Bismarck to resign, "dropping the pilot," in the celebrated phrase. Under the four chancellors who succeeded Bismarck, it was William who dominated policy.

After 1890 Germany embarked upon what was termed a "new course." In foreign affairs this meant a more aggressive and ambitious colonial, naval, and diplomatic policy, as will appear in the next two chapters. In domestic affairs it meant a more conciliatory attitude toward the masses. The antisocialist laws were dropped, and the system of social security legislation was enlarged and codified. But no democratic adjustment seemed possible. William II believed in the divinely ordained prerogatives of the house of Hohenzollern, and the empire still rested on the power of the federated princes, on the Junkers, the army, and the new industrial magnates. But the Social Democrats, the Progressive party, and other democratic forces were growing in strength. They demanded, for Prussia, a reform of the illiberal constitution of 1850,¹⁹ and for the Reich, real control over the federal chancellor by the majority party in the Reichstag. In the election of 1912 the Social Democrats reached a new high by polling four and a quarter million votes, about one-third of the total, and by electing 110 members to the Reichstag, in which they now formed the largest single party; yet they were excluded from the highest posts of government. Even had war not come in 1914, it is clear that the imperial Germany created by Bismarck was moving toward a constitutional crisis in which political democracy would be the issue.