

考试科目名称及代码 专业英语

443

适用专业：一、专门史、国际关系；二、世界史

## 注意：

1. 所有答案必须写在“研究生入学考试答题纸”上，写在试卷和其他纸上无效；

2. 本科目 不允许使用 计算器。

3. 报考专门史、国际关系专业的考生做 1-4 页，世界史的考生做 5-7 页。并将第一部分或第二部分名称写在答题纸第 1 页上“注意”项下方。

第一部分： (一)

The struggle between an alliance of nations defending their independence against one potential conqueror is the most spectacular of the configurations to which the balance of power gives rise. The opposition of two alliances, one or both pursuing imperialistic goals and defending the independence of their members against the imperialistic aspirations of the other coalition, is the most frequent configuration within a balance-of-power system.

To mention only a few of the more important examples, the coalitions that fought the Thirty Years' War under the leadership of France and Sweden, on the one hand, and of Austria, on the other, sought to promote the imperialistic ambitions, especially of Sweden and Austria, and, at the same time, to keep the ambitions of the other side in check. The several treaties settling the affairs of Europe after the Thirty Years' War tried to establish a balance of power serving the latter end. The many coalition wars that filled the period between the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the first partition of Poland of 1772 all attempted to maintain the balance that the Treaty of Utrecht had established and that the decline of Swedish power as well as the rise of Prussian, Russian, and British strength tended to disturb. The frequent changes in the alignments, even while war was in progress, have startled the historians and have made the eighteenth century appear to be particularly unprincipled and devoid of moral considerations. It was against that kind of foreign policy that Washington's Farewell Address warned the American people.

Yet the period in which that foreign policy flourished was the golden age of the balance of power in theory as well as in practice. It was during that period that most of the literature on the balance of power was published and that the princes of Europe looked to the balance of power as the supreme principle to guide their conduct in foreign affairs. As Frederick the Great wrote:



It is easy to see that the political body of Europe finds itself in a violent condition: it has, so to speak, lost its equilibrium and is in a state where it cannot remain for long without risking much. It is with it as it is with the human body which subsists only through the mixture of equal quantities of acids and alkalies; when either of the two substances predominates, the body resents it and its health is considerably affected. And when this substance increases still more, it can cause the total destruction of the machine. Thus, when the policy and the prudence of the princes of Europe lose sight of the maintenance of a just balance among the dominant powers, the constitution of the whole body politic resents it: violence is found on one side, weakness on the other; in one, the desire to invade everything, in the other the impossibility to prevent it; the most powerful imposes laws, the weakest is compelled to subscribe to them; finally, everything concurs in augmenting the disorder and the confusion; the most powerful, like an impetuous torrent, overflows its banks, carries everything with it, and exposes this unfortunate body to the most disastrous revolutions.

It is true that the princes allowed themselves to be guided by the balance of power in order to further their own interests. By doing so, it was inevitable that they would change sides, desert old alliances, and form new ones whenever it seemed to them that the balance of power had been disturbed and that a realignment of forces was needed to re-establish it. In that period, foreign policy was indeed a sport of kings, not to be taken more seriously than games and gambles, played for strictly limited stakes, and utterly devoid of transcendent principles of any kind. Since such was the nature of international politics, what looks in retrospect like treachery and immorality was then little more than an elegant maneuver, a daring piece of strategy, or a finely contrived tactical movement, all executed according to the rules of the game, which all players recognized as binding. The balance of power of that period was amoral rather than immoral. The technical rules of the art of politics were its only standard. Its flexibility, which was its peculiar merit from the technical point of view, was the result of imperviousness to moral considerations, such as good faith and loyalty, a moral deficiency that to us seems deserving of reproach.

From the beginning of the modern state system at the turn of the fifteenth century to the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, European nations were the active elements in the balance of power. Turkey was the one notable exception. Alliances and counteralliances were formed in order to maintain the balance or to restore it. The century from 1815 to the outbreak of the First World War saw the gradual extension of the European balance of power into a world-wide system. One might say that this epoch started with President Monroe's message to Congress in 1823, stating what is known as the Monroe Doctrine. By declaring the mutual political independence of Europe and the Western Hemisphere and thus dividing the world, as it were, into two political systems, President Monroe laid the groundwork for the subsequent transformation of the European into a world-wide balance-of-power system.



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(二)

The issue of homogeneity, i.e. the need for societies to share common internal norms, has been inadequately studied in international relations, most obviously because it seemed to fall into the trap of 'reductionism' castigated by Waltz. Where it has arisen, in the work of writers on interdependence, it has usually been seen as a recent phenomenon. Yet there are grounds for arguing that it underlies the whole history of the international system, and explains why deviations from internal norms are so threatening to international relations. The conundrum of much conflict in the international system is that while revolutions make some challenge to international order these challenges are rather limited: the inter-state rationale for counter-revolution would appear to be rather weak. Yet if homogeneity is made the issue the reason for such conflicts becomes clearer. No one saw this more clearly than Burke (1852) who, in his 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', sketched out the bases of what could be a powerful theory of homogeneity: that social and political peace within one state requires that others conform to broadly the same norms; that states are inevitably affected by changes in their neighbours, even if the latter do not challenge them internationally; and that status quo powers have an obligation to suppress deviations in the international norm to prevent instability from spreading. Burke suggests indeed that there is an 'international society' in the much stronger sense of a society of entities with shared values and it is the protection of this that should dominate inter-state relations (see Halliday, 1992c, 1992d, for more extended discussion of this issue). The work of historical sociologists (Mann, 1986, 1988, following Hintze and Skocpol, and Tilly, 1975: as discussed in Halliday, 1989) suggests a parallel line of enquiry, since it shows how what appear to be discrete, insulated, processes of national evolution and state formation are in fact compelled to conform to prevailing international trends and to imitate each other in order the better to compete. International rivalry therefore acts as a homogenizing force, so that the growth of governmental structures, or of political forms, has, over a period of decades, a convergent character.



There are two obvious objections to this claim for homogeneity. The first is that for long periods of modern history no such pattern has been observed: in the past century, and within the more developed but still semi-peripheral countries, we have seen major deviations to the right (in mid-twentieth-century Germany, Japan, Italy, Spain and Portugal and, in milder form, Ireland; in the 1970s the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes of Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) and to the left (Russia and other communist states). There have also been attempts at more qualified autarchic development under capitalism (Peronist Argentina and Whitlam's Australia being, at certain points, cases of this). Yet in the end both forms have been contained, some by world war, some by transnational erosion and incorporation. What the Second World War did to Germany, Italy and Japan, the European Community and its evident economic success did to Spain, Portugal, Ireland and, in the end, the USSR. In the case of the Latin American countries, the exhaustion of the authoritarian project within, and changing international norms without, combined to produce a continent-wide redemocratization in the late 1980s. The urge towards semi-peripheral escape and deviation is very strong: yet the mechanisms of reincorporation are over a longer period even stronger. If you cannot beat them, you have to try to join them.

The second objection to the homegeneity thesis is that for all the spread of capitalism over the past five hundred years, and especially in the past century, the degree of inequality of wealth and variation in political form between more and less developed countries has increased, and may be continuing to do so. To address this involves some observations on the dynamics of the capitalist system itself.



## 第二部分: 世界史·专业英语

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I Few subjects have been more debated than the reasons for the long decline of the Roman Empire. The celebrated eighteenth-century historian Edward Gibbon blamed Christianity, charging that it destroyed the civic spirit of the Romans by turning their attention to the afterlife and away from their duties to the state. Michael Rostovtzeff, a Russian scholar, attributed the decline in part to the constant pressure by the underprivileged masses to share in the wealth of their rulers, of which there was not enough to go around anyhow. Others have emphasized the influx of Greeks and Orientals into Roman society, intimating that the original Roman sense of unity was thus diluted. Still others have pointed to climatic change and disease. Most recently, archaeologists working with chemical analyses of skeletons from A.D. 79 have concluded that a generally healthy people had fallen prey to chronic lead poisoning, for Roman food and wine were apparently heavily contaminated with lead.

Economically, losses in population caused by plagues and civil war crippled an agriculture already hampered by unprogressive methods and increased soil exhaustion. The growing concentration of land in large estates and the absorption of free farmers into the status of colony diluted Roman prosperity, which suffered from chronically feeble purchasing power and inflation. The urban middle class was declining, while psychologically the masses became alienated from their rulers. The replacement of citizen-soldiers with mercenaries testified to the decline of the old Roman patriotism. Dependence on slavery may have retarded innovation in labor organization and the application of technology. Yet even with all these factors, it would be hard to imagine the Roman decline without terrific pressure from outside forces. It was in the third and fourth centuries that the "barbarian" cultures began to expand, and it was the barbarian threat that most immediately contributed to the collapse of the Roman structure in the West, while permitting its survival in the East in a modified form.

Given all these arguable "causes" for the decline of the Roman Empire, perhaps the best summary, is still Gibbon's famous judgment: "The stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight." Rather than asking why the Empire fell, he thought, historians ought to ask why it had survived so long. (40')

II The outlines of the new regime were already starting to take shape before the October Days. The Great Fear prompted the National Assembly to abolish in law what the peasants were destroying in fact. On the evening of August 4, 1789, the deputies voted that taxation would be paid by all inhabitants of the kingdom in proportion to their revenues, and that public expenses would be borne equally by all. The clergy also gave up tithes, and the liberal minority of the second estate surrendered the nobility's game preserves and manorial dues and courts. The Assembly abolished the remnants of serfdom, forbade the sale of justice or of judicial office, and decreed that "all citizens, without distinction of birth, can be admitted to all ecclesiastical, civil, and military posts and dignities." The Old Regime was dead.



The economic legislation of the National Assembly provided a case in point. Belief in the theory of equal taxation did not solve urgent financial problems, for the new and just land tax imposed by the deputies could not be collected. Tax collectors had vanished in the general liquidation of the Old Regime, and peasants assumed that they owed the government nothing. Once again, the French state borrowed until its credit was exhausted, and then, in desperation, the National Assembly ordered the confiscation of church lands. "The wealth of the clergy, is at the disposition of the nation, it declared, explaining that ecclesiastical lands fell outside the bounds of "inviolable" property as defined in the Declaration of the Right of Man because they belonged to an institution and not to private persons.

The state sold the property seized from the church and from aristocratic who had fled outside the country. Some peasants profited by the opportunity to enlarge their holdings, and many bourgeois also bought up land, sometimes as a short-term speculation. The poor and landless, however, gained nothing, since they could not afford to buy, and the National Assembly made no move to help them. Following Laissez-faire doctrines, the Assembly abolished the guilds and the tariffs and tolls on trade within France. And deeming the few simple organizations of labor unnatural restrictions on economic freedom, it abolished them, too. In June 1791, after an outbreak of strikes, it passed one law, banning strikes, trade unions and many guilds. (40')

**III** This is no class war, but a war in which the whole British Empire and commonwealth of Nation is engaged, without distinction of race, creed, or party. It is not for me to speak of the action of the United States, but this I will say: if Hitler imagines that his attack on Soviet Russia will cause the slightest divergence of aims or slackening of effort in the great democracies who are resolved upon his doom, he is woefully mistaken. On the contrary, we shall be fortified and encouraged in our efforts to rescue mankind from his tyranny. We shall be strengthened and not weaken in determination and in resources.

This is no time to moralize on the follies of countries and governments which have allowed themselves to be struck down one by one, when by united action they could have saved themselves and save the world from this catastrophe. But when I spoke a few minutes ago of Hitler's blood-lust and the hateful appetites which I have impelled or lured him on his Russian adventure I said there was one deeper motive behind his outrage. He wishes to destroy the Russian power, because he hopes that if he succeeds in this he will be able to bring back the main strength of his Army and Air Force from the East and hurl it upon this Island, which he knows he must conquer or suffer the penalty of his crimes.

His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles. He hopes, no doubt, that all this may be accomplished before the winter comes, and he can overwhelm Great Britain before the fleet and air-power of the United States may intervene. He hopes that he may once again repeat, upon a great scale than ever before, that process of destroying his enemies one by one by which he has so long thrived and prospered, and that then the scene will be clear for the final act, without which all his conquests would be in vain — namely, the subjugation of the western Hemisphere to his will and to his system.

The Russian danger is therefore our danger, and the danger of the United States, just as the



cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe. Let us learn the lessons already taught by such cruel experience. Let us redouble our exertions, and strike with united strength while life and power remain. (40')

IV With the end of the ideological conflict that dominated a generation of international affairs, a new world order, shaped by a new agenda, will emerge. If the physical degradation of the planet becomes the principal preoccupation of the global community, then environmental sustainability, will become the organizing principle of this new order. The world's agenda will be more ecological than ideological, dominated less by relationships among nations and more by the relationship between nations and nature. For the first time since the emergence of the nation-state, all countries can unite around a common theme. All societies have an interest in satisfying the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. It is in the interest of everyone to protect the earth's life-support systems, for we all have a stake in the future habitability of the planet.

This is not to suggest, by any means, that all international initiatives will be conflict-free. Issues of who assumes how much responsibility for achieving a given goal, such as climate stabilization, will plague international negotiations long after agreement is reached on the goal itself. Do those in wealthy countries have an obligation to reduce carbon emissions to the same level as those living in poor countries? If preservation of the earth's biological diversity is a goal, should the cost be borne by those who live in the tropical countries that contain the vast majority of the earth's plant and animal species, or is this the responsibility of the international community?

Environmental alliances to deal with specific transnational threats are likely to become commonplace and far more numerous than the military alliances that have featured so prominently since World War II. As noted earlier, leadership in the new order is likely to derive less from military power and more from success in building environmentally sustainable economies. The United States and the Soviet Union, the traditional military superpowers, are lagging badly in this effort and are thus likely to lose ground to those governments that can provide leadership in such a shift.

With time running out in the effort to reverse the environmental destruction of the earth, there is an obvious need for initiatives that will quickly convert our environmentally unsustainable global economy into one that is sustainable. The many means of achieving this transformation range from voluntary life-style changes, such as limiting family size or reducing waste, to regulated changes, such as laws boosting the fuel efficiencies of automobiles and household appliances. But the most effective instrument of all promises to be tax policy--specifically, the partial replacement of income taxes with those that discourage environmentally destructive activities. Prominent among the activities to tax are carbon emissions, the use of virgin materials, and the toxic waste. (30')