

中国科学院研究生院

2008 年招收攻读博士学位研究生入学统一考试试卷

科目名称：行为决策

考生须知：

本试卷满分为 100 分，全部考试时间总计 180 分钟。

一、简答题（每题 10 分，共 40 分）

1. 请举例说明什么是“Mixed motive conflict”。（10 分）
2. Simon (1955;1956) 提出了“bounded rationality”这一概念。请说明“bounded”，在抽象意义上指什么？在具体意义上指什么？（10 分）
3. 请说明什么是“Dual Process Theories”，并举例。（10 分）
4. 请分别说明什么是 Counterfactual thinking 和 Regret？并说明这两个概念之间的关系。（10 分）

二、论述题（1 题 15 分、2 题 20 分、3 题 25 分，共 60 分）

1. 如果你用国内大学生被试简单重复经典 framing effect 和 reflection effect 的实验，但是得到与原始实验完全不同的结果。你打算如何处理你的数据，在报告中作如何解释，如何设计下一步的实验？（15 分）
2. 有谚语说：“If you have only one watch, you always know exactly what time it is. If you have two watches, you are never quite sure what time it is.” 针对第一题（简单重复实验问题）的情景，你如何理解该谚语？如果有人将决策选项（option）的多个维度（dimensions）或特质（attributes）看成是多块“手表”，你是否同意该谚语的观点？（20 分）

Stevenson, Busemeyer and Naylor (1990) outline the general rules that determine the characteristics of choice. They organize a variety of preferential choice rules by crossing three factors: compensatory versus noncompensatory, dimensional versus holistic, and deterministic versus probabilistic.

若你同意该谚语的观点，则支持 Stevenson, Busemeyer and Naylor (1990) 的何种决策策略？若不同意该谚语的观点，又是支持何种决策策略？并说明理由。

3. 请仔细阅读以下论文题目和摘要, 用自己的语言尽可能说明该研究的实验设计、数据处理、统计方法和结果分析等细节。(25 分)

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An examination of ambiguity aversion: Are two heads better than one?

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Abstract

Ambiguity aversion has been widely observed in individuals' judgments. Using scenarios that are typical in decision analysis, we investigate ambiguity aversion for pairs of individuals. We examine risky and cautious shifts from individuals' original judgments to their judgments when they are paired up in dyads.

In our experiment the participants were first asked to specify individually their willingness-to-pay for six monetary gambles. They were then paired at random into dyads, and were asked to specify their willingness-to-pay amount for the same gambles. The dyad's willingness-to-pay amount was to be shared equally by the two individuals. Of the six gambles in our experiment, one involved no ambiguity and the remaining five involved different degrees of ambiguity. We found that dyads exhibited risk aversion as well as ambiguity aversion. The majority of the dyads exhibited a cautious shift in the face of ambiguity, stating a smaller willingness-to-pay than the two individuals' average. Our study thus confirms the persistence of ambiguity aversion in a group setting and demonstrates the predominance of cautious shifts for dyads.

Keywords: ambiguity of probabilities, ambiguity aversion, risk aversion, group decision, dyads.